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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a deprivation of parental rights case 
which originated in the Juvenile Court. The biological 
parents now seek a reversal of the order of the Juvenile 
Court with regard to the termination of all their paren-
tal rights. 
DISPOSITION IN LOHER COURT 
The Juvenile Courtentered an order placing the minor 
child, Carol, in foster care and denying the petition 
for permanent deprivation. The Juvenile Court ordered 
that Rose be placed for adoption, but afforded her the 
right to visit with her biological parents as desired. 
Hith regard to Harold and Dollie, the order permanently 
deprived the parents of all rights and ordered that 
these two children be placed for adoption. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants do not dispute the order with regard 
to Carol. They do seek the reversal of the order 
placing Rose, Harold and Dollie for adoption, and in 
the alternative modifying the order with regard to 
Harold and Dollie to permit these children to have 
contact with their biological parents. 
-l-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Viewing the record in a light favoring the 
successful party below, the evidence demonstrates 
the following: 
l. The State filed a petition seeking permanent 
deprivation of all parental rights with regard to 
four children, Carol, Rose, Harold and Dollie. 
2. At a hearing on March 8, 1977, the State 
moved to amend its petition and made an oral motion 
for psychological examinations of the parents, to 
which counsel for the parents objected. 
3. On March 17, 1977, a pre-trial was held 
and new counsel for the parents objected to the 
re-newed oral motion for psychologicals except as 
it related to the completion of the previous testing 
already commenced by Dr. Tomb. A minute entry for 
March 17, 1977 indicated that the Court ordered Dr. 
Tomb to finish his psychological examination of the 
parents and the Court was to send a letter requesting 
the same to Dr. Tomb. 
4. In April of 1977, Dr. Liebroder administered 
psychological tests to the parents and in May of 1977, 
0r. Berensen administered psychological tests to the 
J2I~~ts. Both of these tests were, apparently, conducted 
-2-
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at the request of Judge Whitmer. There is no record 
of the same however. 
5. The Court made no findings that the physical, 
mental or emotional condition of the parents may be 
a factor in causing the neglect, dependency or delin-
quency of the children before ordering the psycholog-
icals. 
6. There was no notice of a hearing for the 
purpose of obtaining an order from the Juvenile Court 
that the parents submit to a psychological examination, 
nor was their due notice and hearing set for this 
specific purpose. 
7. Following a lengthy trial, the Juvenile 
Court entered an order, granting a motion to dismiss 
the petition for permanent deprivation with regard 
to Carol and continuing her placement in temporary 
foster care. The Court, further, entered an order 
terminating all parental rights with regard to Rose, 
but in an effort to maintain a contact with her 
heritage, permitted her to visit with her parents 
as desired. 
8. The Court also entered an order terminating 
all parental rights with regard to Harold and Doliie 
and ordering that they be placed for adoption. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATIONS 
WHICH WERE ADMINISTERED WITHOUT DUE NOTICE AND A 
HEARING SET FOR THIS SPECIFIC PURPOSE AND OVER THE 
OBJECTION OF COUNSEL FOR THE BIOLOGICAL PARENTS, ARE 
INVALID, &~D SINCE THEY WERE THE ~~IN BASIS FOR THE 
ORDER OF PERMANENT DEPRIVATION, THE ORDER PERMANENTLY 
DEPRIVING THE BIOLOGICAL PARENTS OF THEIR CHILDREN 
SHOULD BE VACATED. 
In 78-Ja-23, U.C.A. annotated as amended, the 
legislature set forth the following guidelines 
with regard to a psychological or psychiatric 
examination of parents: 
After due notice and a hearing set for the 
specific purpose, the Court may order a similar 
examination of a parent or guardian whose ability 
to care for a child is an issue, if the Court 
finds from the evidence presented at the hearing 
that the par~or guardian's physical, mental, 
or emotional condition may be a factor in 
causing the neglect, dependency, or delinquency 
of the child. 
In the instant case there was a hearing on March 
8, 1977, during which the state moved to amend its petition 
for permanent deprivation, and counsel for the state made 
an oral motion for psychological examinations of the 
?arents. Johnathan King, counsel for the parents 
- 4-
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objected on the basis that the parents had already been 
examined by a Dr. Tomb in connection with another child, 
in another matter, and the Court observed that it would 
not make a decision at that time because counsel for 
the parents believed he had a conflict of interest. 
On March 17, 1977 a pre-trial was held and 
Patricia De Michele, new counsel for the parents 
objected to the re-newed oral motion for psychologicals 
except as it related to the completion of the previous 
testing already commenced by Dr. Tomb. 
The Court made no findings that the physical, 
mental or emotional condition of the parents may be 
a factor in causing the neglect, dependency or 
delinquency of the children. But, apparently, as 
the record is silent in this area, the Court sent a 
letter to Dr. Liebroder and Dr. Berensen requesting 
that they test the parents in connection with the case 
in question. 
In April of 1977, Dr. Liebroder administered 
tests to the parents and in May of 1977, Dr. Berensen 
tested the parents. Both of these tests Nere conducted 
at the req·-1est of Judge 1Jhitmer. 
' - ~-
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There is no indication in the file, of any kind, 
that due notice of a hearing for the purpose of 
obtaining an examination of the parents was ever 
submitted to the parents, or to counsel for the 
parents. Further, there is no indication that a hearing 
was set for the specific purpose of obtaining 
a psychological or psychiatric examination of the parents; 
and finally, there is no evidence of any kind in the 
record that the Court ever made a finding from evidence 
presented at said hearing that the parents' physical, 
mental or emotional condition may be a factor in causing 
the neglect, dependency or delinquency of the children. 
Johnathan King, counsel for the parents, 
objected to the administering of the psychological 
examinations, T.4,L.20-22, and ne~< counsel for the 
parents objected to the taking of the examinations, except 
for the completion of the report already commenced by 
Dr. Tomb, T.9,L.l8.24. There was, therefore, no 
consent or waiver by counsel, of the parents' right to 
procedural due process under the statute. 
The parties, individually, did not consent or 
~aive their rights to procedural due process under 
-6-
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the statute in attending the psychological examinations 
administered by Dr. Leibroder and Dr. Berensen. The 
parties were instructed to attend the examinations and 
did what they were requested to do. As to whether or 
not the parents understood the effect of the request 
for psychologicals, Ruby Jackson has a disability 
which makes her unable to clearly understand instruc-
tions, even through an interpreter. Dr. Berensen testi-
fied as follows with regard to Ruby Jackson: 
Dr. Berensen: The person I relied upon and 
had to was the interpreter, and 
she'sworked extensively with deaf 
people, as I understand it, her 
own parents were deaf, and I had 
to rely upon her as a second, 
you know, party to help me. 
She didn't indicate that l1rs. 
Jackson does not understand 
concepts, but that her lack of 
understanding is beyond what 
she has seen in the congenitally 
deaf, that there are other prob-
lems, is the way she put it, and 
she agreed to keep rephrasing the 
questions until she felt as though 
Mrs. Jackson understood them or 
else, she would say to me, "Sh~ 
does not understand that quest~on, 
she's talking about something 
else". T.l37,L5-l5. 
With regard to Marvin Jackson, it is also clear 
that he has difficulty in understanding. Dr. Berensen 
testified as follows: 
- 7. 
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Dr. Berensen: In my conclusion, my diagnostic 
impression is that Mr. Jackson 
would fit the category of 
inadequate personality with 
impulse disorder and a 
borderline I.Q. ~.L.l2-l4. 
If the parties were not handicapped with certain 
learning disabilities, they would certainly be entitled 
to all the protection the law affords with regard to the 
procedural safeguards of 78-3a-23, U.C.A. annotated as 
amended. Since they are handicapped with certain learning 
disabilities, the utmost care and concern should be taken 
to see to it that their rights are fully protected. 
The Court, in ordering the psychologicals of the 
parents by Dr. Liebroder and Dr. Berensen, ignored the 
three (3) important procedural safeguards of 78-Ja-23, 
U.C.A. annotated as amended as follows: 
l. It directed the parents to submit to 
psychological or psychiatric examinations 
without concern for the due notice require-
ment of the statute. 
2. It directed that the parents submit to 
psychological or psychiatric examinations 
without regard for the statutory require-
ment of a hearing set for the specific 
purpose of determining whether or not . 
the parents' physical, mental, or emot~onal 
condition mav be a factor in causing the 
neglect, dep~ndency, or delinquency of the 
child or children. 
-0-
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3. It directed the parents to submit to 
psychological or psychiatric examinations 
without concern for the statutory mandate 
that the Court make findings from the 
evidence presented at a hearing that the 
parents' physical, mental or emotional 
condition may be a factor in causing the 
neglect, dependency, or delinquency of the 
child or children in question. 
In reviewing the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Order, which are based heavily on the testimony 
of Dr. Berensen and the evidence introduced by Dr. 
Liebroder, the Court should reverse the order of the 
Juvenile Court which permanently terminated the rights of 
the biological parents and ordered that the children be 
placed for adoption, on the basis that the biological 
parents were not afforded their right to procedural 
due process in accordance with 78-3a-23, U.C.A. 
annotated as amended, in a proceeding that resulted 
in an order permanently depriving them of custody of 
3 of their minor children and requiring that said 
children be placed for adoption. 
POINT II 
THE MINOR CHILD. ROSE, ALTHOUGH ADOPTABLE, HAS 
REACHED THE AGE AT HI-!ICH IT 1..10l'LD BE I:·POSSIBLE TO 
- 9-
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BREAK TIES WITH HER NATURAL PARENTS, AND IN KEEPING 
WITH THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, THAT PART OF 
THE ORDER THAT SHE BE PLACED FOR ADOPTION SHOULD BE 
VACATED. 
A. BASED ON THE FINDINGS OF FACT. 
In paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact, it is 
observed: 
Dr. Berensen, M.D., testified that in the 
case of both Rose and Carol, it would be difficult, 
in view of their ages, to break the ties with the 
natural parents. 
The order with regard to Carol was that she not 
be placed for adoption and petitioners do not dispute 
the order placing her in temporary foster care with the 
opportunity to visit with petitioners. 
1vith regard to Rose, however, the 10 year old 
minor child of petitioners, any order of the Court 
that the child be placed for adoption could not 
sever the strong ties she has with her natural parents 
and therefore, any attempt to place the child for 
adoption, thereby terminating all parental rights and 
responsibilities, would not be in keeping with this 
important Finding of Fact and that part of the order 
thatthe child be placed for adoption should be vacated. 
-10-
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B. BASED ON THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
The conclusions of law ,.;ere such that the Court 
concluded that adoption for Rose would be impossible 
as follows: 
Rose, although adoptable, has reached an 
age at which it would be impossible to break 
ties with her natural parents. 
Therefore, the Court reached the conclusion that 
the ties with the natural parents were too strong for 
adoption to be a possibility and that part of the order 
that Rose be placed for adoption is inconsistent with 
the Conclusions of Law reached by the Court and should 
therefore be reversed. 
C. THE STATE'S EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT ADOPTION 
IS NOT A POSSIBILITY FOR ROSE. 
Dr. Berensen testified as follows: 
Mr. Oddone: In terms of adoptability, would 
you speak to that issue as it 
relates to Rose? 
Dr. Berensen: I would rather say that Rose 
has no psychiatric disabilities 
in great number, one, two, she 
shows great personality strengths 
and ability to integrate into 
another home. Taken those three 
factors into consideration, I 
would sav that this child is 
adoptabl~. given certain 
modifications. 
Hr. Oddone: T.v'hat ·..;ould those modific2.tions 'Je? 
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Dr. Berensen: Those modifications are that Rose 
has a heritage and that she needs 
to be able to call upon that 
heritage whenever she feels the 
need for it, so that Rose should 
always know that she has a set of 
n~tu:a1 parents and a group of 
s~bl~ngs and she may at times 
need to see that family and 
she should know, as she does 
now and seems comfortable with 
it, that her parents cared about 
her, but that they were unable 
to take care of her. 
Mr. Oddone: And you say she knows that now? 
Dr. Berensen: She knows now, according to the 
Statement she made to me, "Mom 
and dad couldn't take care of the 
children" was the reason for her 
placement and was comfortable 
and accepting of that. 
T.l30, 124-32; T.l41 Ll-10 
If Rose were placed for adoption, under the law, she 
would haven no right to see her natural parents. In 78-30-11, 
U.C.A. annotated as amended, a complete severing between 
parent and child is dictated: 
The natural parents of an adopted child are, 
from the time of the adoption, relieved of all 
parental duties toward and all responsibility for 
the child so adopted and shall have no further 
rights over it. 
According to the testimony of Dr. Berensen, it is 
verv important that Rose maintain her heritage and the 
right to see her parents and siblings as she feels the 
. ~ 
-1.. .... -
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need to do so. Therefore, any final order Qust comply 
with the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the 
evidence presented; and, as an order placing the child 
for adoption is inconsistent therewith, that part of the 
final order should be stricken. 
D. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD SHOULD BE THE 
PARAMOUNT CONCERN OF THE COURT. 
In Taylor~- Waddoups 121 U.274, 241 P.2d 157 
(1952), the Court observed that the best interests of 
the child should be paramount in adoption matters. 
In addition, in 78-30-9, U.C.A. the legislature has adopti. 
the same policy as follows: 
The Court must examine all persons appearing 
before it pursuant to the preceding provisions, 
each separately, and, if satisfied that the inter-
ests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, 
it must make an order that the child shall thence-
forth be re~arcrea: and treated in all respe~ts as 
the child o the person adopting. 
An attempt to create a fiction in the mind of a 
ten year old girl that a new set of adoptive parents are 
her biological parents is unreasonable and not possible 
due to the fact that this ten year old girl knows and 
needs the contact with her natural, biological parents 
The reason for creating the fiction that soc.eone 
other than the biological parents gave birth to the 
child is t~e ass:..;.:::ption ~~-:a': :-:1os: 3do:-ti..c:;s ·.:c\_:.~-.: 'c;e 
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those where the biological parent or parents place an 
infant,not a fully developed child, for adoption, freely 
and voluntarily; believing that it is best for the child. 
Society seeks to protect the child from the hurt it would 
suffer from knowledge of the fact that it had been given 
away by its biological parents. 
Does the reason for this fiction exist in the case 
of a child who is loved and wanted by parents who, 
nevertheless, cannot provide for her adequately; but 
where the child is old enough to have established 
some ties with the parents, such as in the case of ten 
year old Rose? 
Since the law of adoption proceeds on the basis that 
an adopted child is the literal offspring of the adoptive 
parents and all rights and responsibilities with the 
biological parents are terminated on the date of adoption, 
adoption is not in keeping with the best interests of 
this ten year old child. 
The child should continue to have the opportunity to 
·;isit with her biological parents, as ordered by the trial 
Court, and therefore an order doing ~ore than depriving 
:~e parents of custody is inconsistent with the best 
in:::c;rests of t:-;e child. 
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An order placing the child for adoption cuts off 
all rights of the child or the biological parents to 
associate with each other, and thatpart of the final 
order should, therefore, be vacated. 
E. PUNISHMENT OF THE PARENTS IN A PERMANENT 
DEPRIVATION CASE SHOULD NOT BE THE PURPOSE OF THE 
FINAL ORDER, BUT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD SHOULD 
BE THE PRIMARY GOAL OF ANY SUCH ORDER. 
In 1970 Utah Law Review 325 it is observed as 
follows: 
To sever all contact between the biological parents 
and the child serves to punish the parents for their actic~. 
or inaction, in fai:ing to adequately Qeet the needs 
of their child. It does not, however, meet the needs 
of the child, and the order of adoption should be vacated 
<S-
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POINT III 
IF THE ORDER IS VALID WHICH PLACED ROSE FOR 
ADOPTION YET AFFORDED HER THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE AND 
ASSOCIATE WITH HER BIOLOGICAL PARENTS, AS SHE DESIRES, 
IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A VITAL LINK WITH HER HERITAGE; THEN 
TO MAINTAIN THAT VITAL LINK FOR DOLLIE AND HAROLD, THEY 
SHOULD BE AFFORDED TO BE AND ASSOCIATE WITH THOSE SAME 
COMMON PARENTS. 
A. }~ ANDDOLLIE HAVE A RIGHT TO A SENSE OF 
HERIAGE. 
The Court should be concerned not with legal 
niceties, but with the reality of what will occur if 
the children are placed for adoption, yet are denied 
all contact with their biological parents. Under 
Point I, appellants seek a complete reversal of the 
order of the Juvenile Court and in Point II a reversal 
of that part of the order requiring that Rose be 
placed for adoption. In the alternative, if the 
Court determines that an order is valid which places 
a child, rather than an infant, for adoption, 
yet grants it the right to visit and associate with 
its parents, as is the case with the order of the 
Juvenile Court for Rose, t~en appellants seek to 
obtain a like order with regard to Harold and Dollie. 
Dr. Berensen aptly stated the concept when 
she responded to a question about what the effect 
an order would be on Carol and Rose if the parental 
rights were not terminated as follows: 
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Dr. Berensen: I find that difficult to answer 
be7aus7 I feel that the important 
th~n ~s what ha ens in realit 
rat er than what is written 
down on paper legally. P.l34, L. 13-li 
Harold Jackson will be 6 years of age in November 
and Dollie Ann Jackson will be 4 years of age on July 
31, 1978. 
Certainly these 2 children know that while in 
foster care they are not with their biological 
parents. They will also know, when, and if, they 
are placed for adoption, that the adoptive parents 
are not their biological parents. 
As they get older they will naturally want to 
know more about their biological parents. If they 
desire contact with their biological parents, now 
or in the future, they have no right to make that 
contact under the present order. 
A child who can see for itself through face 
to face contact with loving biological parents that, 
as stated by Rose, they love her but aren't able to 
take care of her, can some how sort out and make 
sense of the confusing set of facts which gave rise 
to its having been taken from its biological parents 
and placed for adoption in the horne of strangers. 
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In an article by Nancy Kupersmith, "The Fight to 
Open Up Adoption Records," June Reader's Digest, 27, 
(1978), we are able to take a look into the adoptee's 
feelings with regard to finding natural parents: 
PERSONAL 
Adult who was an adopted child desires 
contact with other adoptees to exchange views 
on adoptive situation and for mutual assistance 
in search for natural parents. 
--Classified ad in New York 
Times, March 21, 1971 
At the time she placed this ad, Florence 
Fisher had just successfully completed a 
20-year search for her natural mother. 
Because adoption records are closed to adoptees· 
in all states except Alabama and Kansas, those 
two decades had been filled with frustration 
and heartache. Her ad was an attempt to 
reach other adoptees seeking to fill the 
void that separates them from their past and 
an effort to hel¥ them avoid the soul-wrenching 
agony she had su fered. 
Out of this vast mutual yearning, Fisher 
created an organization that is helping 
thousands of adoptees in the search for their 
roots. Today, her Adoptees' Liberty Movement 
Association (AU1A) is the largest organization 
of its kind, with 10,000 members scattered 
throughout the 50 states. ALMA's slogan: "The 
truth of his origin is the birthright of every 
ti ::Jan. 
By providing answers, encouragement and hope, 
AL'1A is helping adootees gain Hhat evervone 
else takes for granted: the sense of ~eritage 
that answers the most basic and hauntlng or 
human questions, "Who am I?" 
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Without it, adoptee Pam Synge Hasegawa, 
an ALMA member, claims she is like an island. 
"I want to touch the mainland--to ask 'Who? 
Why? she says. Anita HcCarthy, another ALHA 
member, adds: "The real me lies frozen inside. 
My children have only half of their heritage--
their father's. Is mine any less important 
because I was adopted?" 
Yet, little by little, legal opinion is 
swinging toward the adoptee. In February 1977, 
in the most significant court decision so rar, 
a New Jersey superior court forced an abption 
agency to search for the natural parents; if 
unsuccessful, the agency must give the records 
to the adoptee, unless the state shows "good 
cause" why he should not have them. 
The reasons for placing the children permanentlyfor 
adoption are not inconsistent with re~ular contact 
with their biological parents and Harold and Dollie 
should be permitted to visit and associate with their 
natural parents, thereby maintaining a senseof heritage. 
B. THE ADOPTION STATUTES DO NOT SPECIFICALLY 
PROHIBIT CONTACT BY A CHILD \HTH ITS BIOLOGICAL PARENTS. 
The purpose of the Juvenile Court act is to 
strengthen family ties whenever possible. In 78-Ja-l, 
U.C.A. annotated as amended it is observed: 
It is the purpose of this act to secure 
for each child corning before the juvenile 
court such care, guidance and control, preferably 
in his own horne, as Hill serve his 'Ne lfare and 
strengthen family ties whenever possible; to 
secure for anv child who is renoved from his 
horne the care: guidance and discipline required 
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to assist him to develop into a responsible 
citizen, to improve the conditions and home 
environment responsible for his delinquency; 
and, at the same time to protect the community 
and its individual citizens against juvenile 
violence and juvenile law breaking. To this 
end this act shall be liberally construed. 
We are not here dealing with the placement of 
infants for adoption, but with children who are ages 
4 and 6 respectively and who, in reality, will not 
believe that the adoptive parents are their natural 
or biological parents and will have many questions 
concerning their own heritage. 
It is submitted that three adoption statutes 
govern the relatinship between parent and child 
and the natural or biological parents, as follows: 
l. In 78-30-9, U.C.A. annotated as amended 
it provides: 
The court must examine all persons 
appearing before it pursuant to the preceding 
provisions, each separately, and, if 
satisfied that the interests of the child 
will be promoted by the adoption, it must 
make an order declaring that the child 
shall thenceforth be regarded and treated 
in all respects as the child of the person 
adopting. 
2. In 78-30-10, U.C.A. annotated as amended 
it provides: 
A child when adopted may take the family 
name of the person adopting. After adoption 
the two shall sustain the legal rela~lon of 
~arent and ch~ld, and have all the rlghts 
~nd be subject to all the duties of that 
relation. 
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3. In 78-30-11, U.C.A. annotated as amended 
it provides: 
The natural parents of an adopted 
child are, from the time of the adoption, 
relieved of all parental duties toward and 
all responsibility for the child so 
adopted, and shall have no further rights 
over it. 
None of the foregoing statutes state specifically 
that the child shall be prohibited from being and 
associating with its natural or biological parents. 
Furthermore, these same statutes apply equally to the 
case of an infant, a fully developed child or an 
adult. It is submitted that the intent of these 
statutes is to sever the legal relationship and 
rights and obligations between the biological parent 
and the child but that there is no intent to create 
in the mind of a child old enough to have established 
ties with the natural parent a fiction in the mind 
of said child that the adoptive parents are, by virtue 
of the adoption decree, the biological parents of 
the child. 
It is submitted that since the children can 
benefit by long term placement where there is no 
chance for the child to be shifted from foster home 
to foster home, or from a foster home back and forth 
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between the biological parent and the foster home, 
if the children were placed for adoption, the needs 
of the children would be met; but to fully meet the 
needs of the children, there should be a tie to 
their heritage or biological parents and they should 
be permitted and accorded every right to visit and 
associate with their biological parents. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants seek an order vacating the order of 
the Juvenile Court which terminated all their parental 
rights to Rose, Harold and Dollie. In the alternative 
they seek an order vacating that part of the 
order with regard to Rose which ordered that she be 
placed for adoption. Finally, if the Court concludes 
that the order depriving the parents of all parental 
rights is valid and the order placing Rose for adoption, 
yet affording her the right to visit with her natural 
parents as she desires is also valid; then, appellants 
seek an order that Harold and Dollie be accorded the 
right to visit and associate with their biological parents. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
g~~ ~ID A. GOODILL 
Attorney for Petitioners ~~ 
Appellants Marvin and Ruby 
Jackson 
336 South Third East #103 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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